Allow installers full control of permissions requested by GitHub Apps #209294
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SampsonCrowley
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Apps, API and Webhooks
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🏷️ Discussion Type
Product Feedback
💬 Feature/Topic Area
Apps
Body
GitHub App installations should allow the installing user or organization administrator to reduce any permission requested by the application.
For every requested permission, the installer should be able to select:
write → read → none
The application may warn that reduced permissions can cause features to stop working, but the installer should retain final control.
Effective permissions should be:
app requested ∩ installation approved ∩ user permissions
GitHub already supports restricting an installation to selected repositories and allows an app itself to request reduced permissions when creating installation tokens. The missing security control is allowing the resource owner to enforce that same attenuation.
This matters especially for applications that bundle several unrelated capabilities into one GitHub App. A user may only need PR review, while the application requests permissions required for autonomous agents, workflow execution, branch modification, or other features.
Today the only choices are effectively “grant the vendor everything it requested” or “do not use the integration.” That prevents organizations from applying least privilege at the trust boundary where it actually matters: the resource owner.
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